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Some Comments on Obscenities, Health and
Safety, and Workplace Values
ROBERT J. RABIN*
I see a common and very fundamental issue in both articles. It
has to do with how we view the workplace. Do we see it
through the eyes of the worker on the shop floor (or teacher in
the classroom, or violist in the symphony orchestra), or from the
perspective of those who manage the enterprise? Are we con-
cerned with how it feels to be a worker, who must cope with stress
and deal with uncertainty, or do we think more about the ability
of the enterprise to compete and the investor to secure a profita-
ble return?
Let me begin with the Atleson piece, and offer some observa-
tions from my own experience. I see the foul language cases, as I
think he does, as part of a larger bundle of cases that come under
the heading of insubordination. For some reason, these cases have
provided substantial grist for my own modest arbitration mill.
While my "study" isn't as systematic as Atleson's, I've probably
looked at as many cases.
I have attempted in these cases to uphold the honorable rule
of "obey now, grieve later." But many times I have balked at the
result because it is so harsh. The pattern is familiar: A worker has
an honest disagreement with his boss over an assignment. Perhaps
he feels he has drawn a rotten task too many times, or he believes
his foreman is riding him excessively. He complains to his fore-
man. He attempts, at first in a conversational manner, to suggest
why he is correct. Maybe the language escalates to obscenity.
Eventually the foreman, also under pressure, pulls the plug: "Do
this. It is an order. Refusal is insubordination." The stakes sud-
denly change enormously. By simply uttering the magic words,
*Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. In keeping with the informal
style of these comments, I've tried to hold down the footnotes. Where I thought the reader
might appreciate some references, I've grouped them at a couple of points in the text. I
haven't provided citations to my own awards that I refer to, as they are unpublished and
the parties may wish me to preserve confidentiality.
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the foreman places the employee in peril of termination.
How do these incidents come to such a head? As I listen to
the grievant's story, I usually realize that he is only trying to pre-
serve his own sense of dignity and self-worth. He rails against an
order that demeans him. Let me give some examples.
I saw the "obey now, grieve later" rule urged with a ven-
geance in a recent case involving a firefighter. The employer in-
toned solemnly at the hearing that the department was a quasi-
military organization that could not tolerate deviation from com-
mand. I trembled as I pictured the grievant refusing to climb the
ladder into the towering inferno. What was it that he had refused
to do? His superior officer had commanded him to remove a day
old pot of soup from the refrigerator at the end of his shift. The
grievant protested-a waste of perfectly good soup; his buddy on
the following shift would eat it. The officer repeated the order.
The firefighter, unable to believe this silliness, and unwilling to
take it, simply walked out. Discipline was imposed.
In another case, a supervisor asked for volunteers for Satur-
day work. The job that the grievant had heard described was not
burdensome. But when the grievant showed up on Saturday he
found that he had been assigned to a hard, dirty job. He balked.
It was not what he had agreed to do. When he was ordered to do
the work and grieve later, he protested again. Words were ex-
changed, the talk became heated, and the refusal more firm. What
was the employee doing? In my judgment he was making a state-
ment that his self-worth was more important, at least for the mo-
ment, than merely being a cog in a production machine. Also, if
he had thought about it, he would probably have concluded that
he couldn't really preserve his dignity later in some distant
arbitration.
I think something like that is going on in many of the foul
language cases. David Mamet's play, Glengarry Glen Ross, gives us
a slice of workplace language that makes the workplaces described
by Atleson seem like church. I believe the language in Mamet's
play expresses the powerlessness and frustration of salesmen in
their workplace. Driven to meet a sales quota, and thwarted by
the refusal of invisible managers to provide them with decent
leads, they lash out through language at the unfairness of their
plight. Interestingly, salvation appears to some of them through
the hope of entrepreneurship.
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If we understand what moves a worker to defy authority, and
if we sympathize with his plight, why do we so readily accept the
"obey now, grieve later" rule? At the very least, why do we not
look into the underlying reasons for the refusal to obey or the
foul language, and why do we so readily accept the severe magni-
tude of the punishment?
This has puzzled me. As an arbitrator, my bread is equally
buttered on both sides. There is no need for me to accept a rule
that comes down so hard on the employee. Curious, I took an-
other look at Katherine Stone's article on Industrial Pluralism.'
When I first read it I said to myself that this cannot be right' She
says that the traditional model of labor relations, which she de-
scribes as "industrial pluralism," does not work as warranted. This
model, she claims, does not account for the imbalance of power
between the worker and employer. She says that by driving
problems into private mechanisms, or "privatizing" them, we take
them out of the public eye and ignore them. Thus, she concludes,
society fails to tackle important workplace problems.
As one weaned under the traditional model, I railed at her
conclusions. Unions do provide effective representation, a proper
balance is drawn, and arbitration is a sound system for securing
these rights, I thought. While I agreed with many of Stone's ob-
servations about such topics as the scope of bargaining, I thought
that her observations about the imperfection of arbitration were
wrong.
By looking at Atleson on Obscenities and Gross and Green-
field on Health and Safety, however, I begin to see that Stone's
observations may be closer to the mark. Indeed, I read Atleson to
suggest that arbitrators accept value judgments that reflect the in-
terest of the dominant power in the work relationship.
But I believe that there is more to it, and that something can
be done about it. One explanation for why arbitrators follow the
"obey now, grieve later" rule so slavishly is that we have a hard
time ignoring a rule of such long standing. If we did ignore it,
both union and management would say of us that we are not in
the mainstream, have turned our backs on a rule accepted for
1. Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L. J. 1509 (1981).




generations, are unpredictable, and thus are unacceptable. In-
deed, as we write these very words, some of us may jeopardize our
own acceptablity as arbitrat6rs. This reality is one of the limita-
tions upon scholarship dealing with arbitration.
Another explanation for acceptance of the rule is that it has
been around for so long that we have lost sight of its origins.
When we don't pay attention to a rule's foundations, we don't
have the luxury of knocking it down through intellectual analysis.
The seminal "obey now, grieve later" arbitration award of Harry
Shulman is referred to at length in both of the articles. Curious to
learn more, I read the original case.2 Here is what happened:
Significantly, the grievance arose during World War II. Shul-
man says "it was desirable to keep the supercharger going in that
building . ..because of the great need for that product in the
war effort . . ."' He refers at the outset to the "blockade of
Gates 9 and 10, . . . incident to the memorable disturbance in the
aircraft building."'4 This language is indicative of the cryptic na-
ture of the decision (an inevitable price for the welcome brevity of
Shulman's awards) so we're not sure exactly what was up. We can
infer that, however, there was a special situation at this plant:
work had been disrupted, and production was needed during war-
time. Contrary to what one might think when reading an account
of the abitration award, it was not a rank and file worker who was
disciplined here. Rather, it was a committeeman who had in-
structed other workers not to work outside their normal duties.
It was against the background of the war and other disrup-
tions that Shulman delivered his stern lecture to the bargaining
unit. He addressed the assumption that a committeeman could
countermand orders: "That assumption is wrong. And it should
be clearly understood that it is wrong."" The famous sermon
about an industrial plant not being a debating society followed. In
dictum, he extended his position to rank and file workers as well
as committeemen. I think Shulman's position should be under-
stood as a firm rebuke for an act that was unacceptable given a
special situation. Even at that, the committeeman received only a
four-day suspension, although the mildness of the penalty may
2. Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 779 (1944) (Shulman, Arb.).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 780.
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have been influenced by the company's past treatment of others
for the same type of conduct.
I wondered how far Shulman intended to take his rule. I
needed to look no further than the very next case in the reports.6
In that case, which came up two years later, after the war, glaziers
had refused to accept a painting assignment because they claimed
that it would make them ill. The glaziers were discharged. Shul-
man did not treat the refusal as a health and safety issue. Rather,
he assumed that they refused the new job because it was not
within their job description. Shulman reinstated the grievants
with full back-payl He said that his prior award should not be ap-
plied to skilled craft employees when the assignment clearly took
them outside their regular classifications. In language presenting a
stark contrast to today's insubordination cases, Shulman said:
"[N]or was there any emergency or unusual reason for the assign-
ment . . . . And supervision persisted in making the assignment
over a period of time despite the aggrieved's protests and despite
the clear difference in the two classifications."
7
Stunned, I did further reasearch and found that Shulman
himself read other exceptions and qualifications into his own
"obey now, grieve later" rule. In one case, for example, the union
had called three of its alternate committeemen to attend to a par-
ticular matter. Their supervisor ordered them to remain on the
job. Shulman upheld their right to walk off the job to take care of
union matters, but he did observe that their absence would not
interfere with production.8 In another case, he. refused to find
that workers had engaged in a strike when they delayed their start
of work for an hour and disputed management's work assignment.
"The cause of the delay," said Shulman, "was plainly a failure in
Management's duty of communication to the employees on a mat-
ter of considerable importance to them."9
I didn't read any further. Perhaps some scholar, intrigued by
these clues, will dig some more. But surely the wee evidence I've
found indicates that the origins of the rule running through the
modern cases are not nearly as pervasive and inflexible as today's
arbitral awards suggest.
6. Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 782 (1946) (Shulman, Arb.).
7. Id. at 783.
8. Ford Motor Co., 10 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 213 (1948) (Shulman, Arb.).
9. Ford Motor Co., 10 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 148, 150 (1948) (Shulman, Arb.).
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Maybe it is time to take another look at the foundations of
the "obey now, grieve later" rule. By piecing together the excep-
tions and qualifications that have developed over the years, as I've
done .with just a few of Shulman's awards, we might arrive at a
very different understanding of the rule. We would probably con-
tinue to agree with the general proposition that orders must be
obeyed. We would get nowhere if each participant had to calcu-
late whether the grounds of the refusal are more weighty than the
need to get the job done immediately.
But by studying past decisions, perhaps a more detailed set of
rules would emerge. Just as we say that health and safety cases are
an exception to the obligation to obey now (although we may pay
no more than lip service to this notion), we might be able to cata-
logue other exceptions, as Shulman did. We might say, as Shul-
man suggested in his decision involving the one-hour delay,10 that
it is not proper to order a worker to carry out a task until he has
an opportunity to say his piece, and that no penalty may be im-
posed until the employee has a chance to consult with a union
representative. We might want to limit this exception to cases that
do not seriously interfere with production. We might want to con-
sider the events leading up to the refusal, and whether manage-
ment provoked it.
We should also think about the flip side of the equation,
whether the employee's rights can be adequately vindicated if he
obeys now and grieves later. I heard a case in which a skilled
tradesman had refused to continue digging a ditch, and the evi-
dence showed that his task was useless and foolish. What remedy
could an arbitrator impose if the worker complied and grieved?
Order his supervisor to dig a ditch? One solution is to use a sched-
ule of liquidated damages for employees who obey improper
orders.
As with so much of the good work that exposes the frailties of
the present assumptions of workplace law, Atleson's article
doesn't provide a helpful vision for the future. We need to de-
velop a model that gives due recognition to individual worth, yet
harmonizes individualism with the basic need to get the work
done.




these cases the arbitrator has a well-established rule to work with
to protect the grievant-the health and safety exception to "obey
now, grieve later." Some generous standards outside the arbitral
forum give the worker considerable leeway in determining the
health and safety of his environment. For example, the Secretary
of Labor promulgated a rule under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act authorizing an employee to refuse work because of a
reasonable apprehension of serious risk;1 this standard was up-
held by the Supreme Court in the Whirlpool case.12 In Washington
Aluminum,"3 the Court held that a walkout to protest cold working
conditions was protected under section 7 of the NLRA regardless
of the reasonableness of the workers' decision. And section 502 of
the NLRA provides that the "quitting of labor. . . in good faith
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work" does not
constitute a strike.1 4 Yet, as Gross and Greenfield observe, the
standard that has emerged in arbitration is much more restrictive
of worker rights.
I heard an arbitration case in which telephone line techni-
cians had refused to go up on their poles when the temperature
was below zero. I asked the parties how anyone could know when
it is too cold, and found that one has to go by a subjective feel, at
least when there is some objective evidence to support the feeling.
But why in the cases mentioned in Gross and Greenfield's article
do the arbitrators impose a much tougher standard on the
worker?
Gross and Greenfield tell us that the arbitral values mirror
those suggested by Professor Atleson: "This value judgment is
rooted in conceptions of the rights of private property [that] . . .
encourage industrial undertakings by making the burden on en-
trepreneurs as light as possible." Are arbitrators fully conscious of
upholding this philosophy? Do we really think that decisions
favoring health and safety will impair efficiency? Or have we sim-
ply been lulled by habit into intoning phrases? I prefer to think it
11. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(2) (1985).
12. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 455 U.S. 1 (1980).
13. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
14. National Labor Relations Act § 502, ch. 120, 61 stat. 162 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982)). I realize that the context of the latter two rules is
somewhat different-the scope of protected activity under section 7 and the right to strike.
The point is that in all three settings the worker is given reasonable scope to make his own
assessment of the situation.
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is the latter. I hope that articles like Gross and Greenfield's will
make arbitrators, commentators and workers realize the enor-
mous hazards of work, see that risk sharing does not belong solely
to the worker, and recognize that self-help advances further the
important societal value of keeping workers healthy and alive.
These values are reflected in two recent statutes, as Gross and
Greenfield point out: OSHA and the Rehabilitation Act. The dis-
cussion of the second is especially poignant. Apparently the news
that our society expects employers to make reasonable accommo-
dations for its less able workers has not yet reached arbitrators. I
hope these values eventually take hold.
The article performs a valuable service by articulating two
factors that influence these decisions-considerations that might
be buried in a more casual reading of the cases. The first is the
shift of the burden of proof to the employee. The second con-
cerns the substantive tests. Arbitrators might reassess their deci-
sions if they realized how the burden is turned around in these
cases, and how the tests used in arbitration are starkly less tolerant
of the worker than those under external law. It is shocking that
the OSHA standard-that a worker may refuse work upon a rea-
sonable belief that it is unsafe-was used to effect reinstatement
in only one arbitration case of the more than 500 canvassedl It
was used as a criterion in one-third of the cases, but only to miti-
gate the penalty. The other two-thirds used standards of objective
proof and reasonably objective proof.
Paradoxically, the worker covered by a collective bargaining
agreement may have less protection than his unrepresented coun-
terpart. This is because of the various doctrines that drive con-
flicts into arbitration and then insulate them from judicial review.
For example, the truck driver in the well known City Disposal
case 15 was protected under section 7 of the Act when he refused
to drive a truck that he "honestly and reasonably" believed to be
unsafe. If he filed such a charge today, he would find the Board
15. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984) (holds that an employee
who refuses to drive a truck that he reasonably and honestly believes to be unsafe is en-
gaged in protected concerted activity under section 7 of the NLRA, and may not be dis-
charged for this activity). The decision is limited to those cases in which the employee is
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, for then it can be presumed that he is acting
in concert with fellow employees.
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deferring his case to arbitration under United Technologies.16 He
might lose under the majority approach reviewed in the Gross and
Greenfield article. The Board would then accept that decision
under Olin Corp. 1 7 It is unclear whether the employee would get a
second bite at the apple under OSHA, depending on whether the
Supreme Court treats these cases under Gardner-Denver,"8 and al-
lows a de novo look, or concludes that the arbitration award is
dispositive.19
Gross and Greenfield parallel Atleson's analysis when they ob-
serve that the health and safety cases are really treated under an
insubordination rubric. The only difference is that in these cases
the employee is given the opportunity to show that his otherwise
unacceptable refusal fits an exception. Yet, as the authors note,
the burden then shifts to the employee.
Gross and Greenfield unearth an irony in the cases. While
health and safety yields to efficiency when the employee refuses to
work, they are paramount where the issue is whether manage-
ment may promulgate a rule. This suggests that the conflict isn't
between health and safety and efficiency so much as it is between
worker and management control. The same values are at work in
public sector cases holding that safety demands regarding such
things as crew size are not mandatory subjects of bargaining be-
cause they really go the direction of the enterprise.
Another parallel between the two articles is in their analyses
of credibility. Atleson tells us why arbitrators believe manage-
ment. Gross and Greenfield report the same thing when they ob-
serve the arbitral presumption that management acts out of con-
16. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984) (where an employee files a
charge with the NLRB under sections 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3), asserting interference with his sec-
tion 7 rights, that claim must be deferred to arbitration and resolved in the first instance
under the collective bargaining agreement).
17. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). The opinion concludes that the Board will
not entertain any further charge if: (1) the contractual issue in arbitration is factually paral-
lel to the unfair labor practice issue; (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the
facts relevant to the dispute under the Act; and (3) his or her award is not "clearly repug-
nant" to the Act, or "palpably wrong."
18. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The decision allows an
employee to process a claim under Title VII even though the same issue has been
presented in arbitration. However, the Court states that the arbitration award may be
given "great weight" in the Title VII proceedings. Id. at 60 n.21.
19. It is unclear how far the rule of Gardner-Denver will be extended to contract claims
that are parallel to claims under other statutes.
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cern for safety rather than to thwart individual or collective
rights.
I wonder why arbitrators buy into this system. I've tried to
suggest that we're not prisoners of an economic system. I thought
that it was habit. Perhaps the hierarchical vision just hasn't been
replaced with a different model of work-one of cooperation and
sharing. When Gross and Greenfield conclude that discharge is
imposed on workers for refusal to work "as lessons designed to
discourage other employees from challenging management's or-
ders," one thinks of workers as children, or worse, as prisoners.
This is a rotten notion of work. The family analogy is promising,
but families can also be hierarchical and autocratic, rather than
sharing and open. Why do we think of work this way? Is it because
there is no other model? Do arbitrators unconsciously accept a
role in the hierarchy of management and worker? Do we see our-
selves as fathers and mothers telling our children how to behave,
and setting examples so that other miscreants, tempted to steal,
will think again?
The articles expose the underlying values behind the existing
arbitral approach to both the obscenity and health and safety
cases. Gross and Greenfield suggest some alternative value systems
for the latter. They are found in the legislative purposes behind
OSHA and the Rehabilitation Act. I'm less sure how to identify
the values that would let us rethink the obscenity cases, and I
hope Atleson's article provokes more thinking along these lines.
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